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Tariff reduction designed to move toward an outward-  *  Zero rating of exports under the VAT.
oriented development strategy will work only if  *  Taxes on selected exports either where world
alternative revenue sources can be found to offset  demand for the country's exports is expected to
revenue losses that often accompany reduced protec-  remain inelastic or where the country is subject to
tion. The reason is that such losses can exacerbate  export quotas.
macroeconomic difficulties, lead to delays or reversals
in trade liberali7ation programs,  and make policy  It is important to view the foregoing elements as
change less credible.  part of an interrelatcd package: for example, attempts
to unify customs duties at levels higher than the
Tariffs on imports do two things:  protect  recommend&d  range would create administrative
domestic producers and raise public revenues. Even  problems in implementing duty exemptions on inputs
the poorest countries have essentially two instruments  entering domestic production.
for fulfilling those two objectives:  (i) customs duties
and (ii) sales taxes and value-added taxes (VATs) on  Coordinated reform of an existing distoned
imports.  Since the customs duty raises the price  structure of tariffs and domestic taxes would include
facing domestic produccrs of an imported good above  the following:
the world price, it is a subsidy to domestic producers.
Since the sales tax/value-added tax, together with the  e  Matching the sales and value-added tax rates on
customs duty, raises the price facing users of the  domestic production and imports, to transfer the
impon above the world price, they tax domestic users.  function of protection to customs duties.
The customs duty can then serve protection objec-  *  Bringing customs duties on items for which there
tives, while the two together can be designed to meet  is no domestic production and which are therefore
revenue requirements.  purely revenue-raising under the rubric of the sales
tax/ value-added tax.
Opportunities for radical redesign of the incentive  *  Offsetting any reduction in customs duties with
structure are rare. TIhe  following integrated structure  an equivalent increase in the sales tax/value-added tax
of taxes cum tariffs provides a point of reference  structure - which, since that tax applies to domestic
toward which less comprehensive reforms may be  production as well as imports, would increase
directed:  revenues. A smaller-than-equivalent upward adjust-
ment in the sales value-added structure would
* A uniform basic customs duty of no more than  therefore suffice if the change were required to be
10-15 percent and an exemption from duty for  revenue-neutal.
imported inputs entering export production.
* A basic uniform VAT (preferably on consump-  More realistically, the rate structure might have
tion) - the rate determined by revenue requirements  to be raised beyond the point of revenue-neutrality to
- on both domestic production and imports with  allow for assistance to sectors hurt by the tariff
agriculture exempted, particularly nonmarketed food  reduction. Such assistance, if extended through the
consumed by the poor.  budget process, would have the advantage vis-a-vis
* A luxury or excise tax applied at a common rate  protective tariffs of being explicit and thus subject to
to both domestic production and imports of selected  periodic scrutiny.
items.
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Tariffs  on imports  protect  domestic  producers  and  raise  public  revenue.
Thus the  World  Development  Report  1987  finds  that  effective  rates  of  protection
to  manufacturing  in developing  countries  typically  exceed  40 percent  while  the
World  Development  Report  1988  estimates  that  the  importance  of import  taxes  in
tax  revenue  is  over  20  percent  in  Asia,  sub-Saharan  Africa  and  in  the  Middle  East
and North Africa  compared  to 2 percent in the industrial  countries.  These
figures  make clear  that  tariff  reform  which  is intended  to reduce  anti-export
bias  and  promote  an  outward-oriented  development  strategy  can  be viable  only  if
alternative  and  administratively  collectible  sources  of  revenue  can  be found  to
offset  potential  revenue  losses. The  tradeoff  between  liberalization  and  fiscal
imperatives  is  thus  frequently  central  to tariff  reform.
This  paper  argues  that  tariff  reform  must  be seen  as  part  of a  broader
program  of tax  reform. The  need  to adopt  such  a public  finance  perspective  is
argued  with reference  to selective  reviews  of country  experience  with trade
liberalization  and  tax  reform,  protection  and  revenue  objectives  in  developing
countries  and  the  instruments  available  to  further  those  policy  goals. The  main
points  emerging  from  the  analysis  are  as follows.
1.  Since  it is generally  accepted  that lack  of supportive  macroeconomic
policies  has led  to delays  or reversal  in trade  liberalization  programs,  it  is
important  that  potential  losses  in  public  revenue  arising  from  tariff  reductions
be offset so as not to exacerbate  macroeconomic  difficulties.  The common
practice  of  pursuing  tariff  and  tax  studies  independently  carries  the  risk  that
the  revenue  implications  of tariff  reform  and  the implications  for  protection2-
and efficiency of  tax reform may not be properly  integrated, with negative
consequences for the credibility of policy change.
2.  The  adoption of a more comprehensive public finance perspective on
policy reform is  made possible by the fact that even the  poorest countries  have
essentially two sets of instruments for the taxation of imports: (a) customs
duties and (b) sales taxes/value added taxes, that:  are usually levied on the
customs duty-inclusive  value of imports and that apply to domestic transactions
as well.  Since the  customs duty raises the price facing producers of an import
above the world price, it is a subsidy to domestic producers.  Since the sales
tax/value added tax, together with the customs duty, raises the price facing
users of the import above the world price, they constitute a tax on domestic
users.  The customs duty can then serve protection objectives, while the two
together can be designed to meet revenue requirements.  These tax and subsidy
margins play a useful role in the discussion on tariff reform under point 5
below.
3.  While the  opportunities for  radical redesign  of the  incentive structure
are rare, the following integrated structure of taxes cum tariffs provides a
point of reference towards which less comprehensive reforms may be directed.
This comprises (a)  a basic customs duty at a uniform rate of  no more than 10 to
15 percent,  (b) a basic value added tax, preferably of the consumption type,
applying at a uniform  rate, depending on revenue requirements, to domestic
production  and imports,  and  exempting  agriculture,  in  particular  nonmarketed  food
consumed by the poorest, (c)  a luxury rate or excises applying at a common rate
to  domestic production and imports  of selected items, (d)  zero rating  of exports
under the value added tax, (e) exemption of  imported inputs entering export
production from customs duty, and (f) taxes on selected exports either whereworld demand for the country's exports is expected to remain inelastic  or where
the country is subject to export quotas.  The paper argues that it is important
to view  the above elements as part of an interrelated package  so that, for
example, attempts to  unify customs duties at levels  higher than the recommended
range  [as in (a)) would create administrative problems  in implementing duty
exemptions on inputs entering export production [point (e)].
4.  The above prescriptions must be regarded as rules of thumb that can
generate  broadly  acceptable  outcomes  in  terms  of  efficiency,  equity  and
protection  and  that  should  be  flexibly  applied  in  the  light  of  country
circumstances  and administrative  capability.  They are  not properties of  optimal
tariff and tax structures.  Thus the  value to policy advisors of analytically-
oriented studies of taxes and tariffs would be enhanced if the latter were to
identify  circumstances  where  the  pursuit  of  such  rules  is  likely  to  be
inappropriate,  rather than  construct  empirically  implausible  special  cases  where
they hold exactly.
5.  The coordinated reform of an existing distorted structure of tariffs
and domestic taxes in accordance with the above principles will  include the
following  components. The sales  tax/VAT  rates  on  domestic  production  and imports
should be matched,  so as to transfer the function of protection to customs
duties.  Customs duties on items for which there is no domestic production and
which are therefore purely revenue-raising should be brought under the rubric
of the sales tax/VAT.  A lowering of customs duties to reduce the excess of
producer prices over world prices (the  element of protection), if  unaccompinied
by other measures, would also reduce the excess  of user prices over  world prices
(the customs duty-cum-sales tax on users) and thus erode  public revenue.  Hence
reduction of protection per se, interpreted  as a narrowing of the  wedge betweenproducer prices  and world prices, is achieved by combining the lowering of
customs duties with an equal upward adjustment to the sales tax/VAT structure
to restore the tax wedge between user prices and world prices prevailing before
the tariff reduction.  This, however, would be revenue-enhancing because the
sales tax/VAT applies to imports as well as domestic consumption, so that the
higher rate structure, while exactly offsetting the revenue loss from customs
duties on imports, would bring in more revenue from domestic consumption.  If
the objective is simply to offset the revenue losses from tariff reductions, a
smaller adjustment to the sales tax/VAT structure than the one described above
will suffice.  More realistically, the rate structure would need to be raised
somewhat beyond the point of revenue neutrality so  as to allow the government
to  meet  such  demands  for  adjustment assistance  as  may  arise  from  sectors
adversely affected by tariff reductions.  Such assistance, if extended via the
budgetary  process,  would  have the  advantage  vis-a-vis protective  tariffs  of  being
explicit and thus subject to periodic scrutiny.-5-
I. INTRODUCTION
The Setting
1.  The  value of  adopting  an  outward-oriented  development  strategy  has  found
increasing acceptance among economists.'  The move towards outward orientation
requires, inter afia, that countries reduce the bias against exports caused by
the extensive use of tariffs and quantitative restrictions on imports.  Thus,
for example, the World Development Report, 1987 found that effective rates of
protection  to manufacturing  in the  late 1970s were  as high  as 44%  in the
Philippines, 5'. in Colombia  and 82% in  Nigeria  and, with the  exception of  Korea
and Singapore, that effective rates of protection were lower for exports vis-
a-vis domestic sales.
2.  It is now generally accepted that trade liberalization  can be delayed
or aborted in the  absence of  complementary  macroeconomic  policies, in  particular
appropriate fiscal policies. 2 With public sector deficits averaging 7% of GDP
in developing  countries, 3 it is particularly  imports '  that  revenue losses
arising  from  tariff  reductions  be  offset  by  identifying  alternative  and
administratively  collectible  sources  of  revenue  so  as  not  to  exacerbate
macroeconomic difficulties.  That these  could  be potentially significant  emerges
from the  World Development Report 1988  which estimated that the contribution of
import taxes to tax revenue in 1985  was 14% in Latin America, 21% in Asia, 22%
in the Middle East and North Africa and 26% in sub-Saharan Africa, as compared
to 2%  in industrial countries.  The tradeoff between moves  towards outward
orientation and fiscal imperatives  is thus  frequently central to policy reform.
'For  an authoritative account, see Balassa (1989a).
2The relevant literature is cited in Halevi (1988).
3Based  on a sample of 33 countries in 1986, as reported in Chhibber and K.
Shirazi (1988).-6-
Plan of the Paper
3.  This paper argues that tariff  reform must be seen as part of a broader
program of tax reform.  Section II outlines advice that is typically given on
tariff  and  tax  reform  and  points  to  instances  where  the  two  have  been
insufficiently coordinated.  Section  III looks  at  the  instruments used  by
d_veloping countries to further  protection and revenue objectives.  Section IV
lays out the contours of tax and tariff design in the light of efficiency and
equity objectives  and  constraints  on administrative  capacity  in developing
countries.  Section V eximines how those ides may be used to guide the reform
of tax and tariff  structures.  Section  VI brings together  the main points of the
paper.
II. WORLD BANK ADVICE
Tariff Reform
4.  Trade policy reform  has been an important  component of the  World Bank's
dialogue  with  countries and  has accounted for  30%  of the  conditions in  adjustment
lending. [World Bank (1989b)]  While details vary from country to country, the
core set of Bank recommendations on the reform of import  policy consists in (a)
converting  quantitative restrictions  and  other forms  of  nontariff licensing into
tariffs; (b) reducing the level and dispersion of tariffs. 4 It is recognized
that such a system  necessarily discriminates  against  exports: the  bias is  offset
in part through a variety of schemes that exempt from tariffs imported inputs
entering into export production.
4A recent review [World Bank (1989b)] describes "a practical first-phase
goal for reforms...is to...reduce tariffs to reasonably low levels, say to a
range of 15 to 30 percent over the medium term."  Another review of policy
recommendations regarding tariff reform in eleven countries [Rajaram (1989)]
noted that "a  few  reports  appeared to  favor  a long  term  uniform/maximum  effective
rate of protection of about 20%".-7-
5.  A  recent  review of Bank  recommendations on  tariff reform  [Rajaram
(1989))  found  however  that  the  revenue  implications  were  not  addressed
systematically.  Thus,  to give  a  few examples,  a  1984  recommendation to
eliminate the Special Import Tax in Morocco miscalculated the revenue impact
which, together with the poor initial performance of the value added tax, led
to a subsequent tariff increase.  A similar situation obtained in Thailand in
1981 because proposals for alternative sources of revenue focussed oil  one-time
increases rather than elasticity-enhancing  tax reform.  The revenue effect also
appeared to have been underestimated in the Philippines.  The government then
introduced an across-the-board import tax and a domestic turnover tax to raise
revenue, but this is ascribed  more to the deterioration of the economy in  1983-
86 than to tariff reform.  The program of import liberalization was, however,
stalled by those developments.
Tax Reform
6.  The Bank  had not till  recently  been active in  offering  tax  policy advice
based on a detailed assessment of tax instruments and options.  Data for 1987-
89 indicates,  however, a  more active  involvement  compared  say to  the  period 1980-
86.  In  Malawi, the  Bank recommended that  t.riffs  be reduced on  competing imports
and intermediate goods and eliminated aitogether on noncompeting imports.  The
r venue  losses  were  to  be  made  up by  raising the  surtax which,  with  the
introduction  of crediting  mechanisms,  could  be turned into  a  manufacturer/import
level consumption tax.  In Bangladesh, it  was estimated that the revenue impact
of tariff reduction in selected  key industrial sectors would amount to roughly
1.5 percent of tax revenue.  The Bank  proposed a wide-ranging package of refozm
designed (i)  to raise revenue  in the  short  run and (ii)  to  enhance the  elasticity
of the tax system in the medium-to-long term  via structural tax reform.  More-8-
generally,  the recommended  reform  of indirect  taxation  proposed in various
countries  usually  consists  in moving  towards  a value  added tax or a single-
stage  sales  tax,  with symmetric  treatment  of domesti!  production  and imporcs.
7.  A selective  review  of Bank involvement  with tariff  and tax reform
studies  [Rajaram  (1989)]  suggests  that  the  two  sets  ot exercises  are  tc  a large
extent  conducted  separately.  It  has  already  been  noted  that  tariff  studies  have
generally  not  addressed  revenue  issues  systematically.  Nor  has  enough  attention
always  been  paid  to  the  protective  role  of  domestic  tax-subsidy  instruments  that,
in  addition  to  tariffs,  extend  favorable  treatment  to  local  producers. In  turn,
tax  studies,  while  recommending  symmetric  treatment  of  domestically  produced  and
imported  goods,  have left analysis  of the structure  and level of protective
customs  duties  to tariff  studies. This separation  has an obvious  practical
advantage  from  the  point  of view of the  management  of tasks.  It also  has the
apparent  virtue of not straining  absorptive  capacity  of policy makers in
countries  where  such  resources  are  often  scarce,  although  the  policy  reversals
that  have occurred  in the  examples  noted  above  as a result  of not addressing
budgetary  concerns  potentially  compromised  the  credibility  of reform. It  will
be argued  in this  paper  that  a coordinated  trade-cum-public  finance  perspective
on these  issues  is  much to  be desired. 5
III.  TAX  AND  TARIFF  IN  .AUMENTS
I.  The taxation  of imports  usually  consists  of (i)  a customs  duty that
applies  to the  c.i.f.  price  and (ii)  a sales  tax/VAT  that  is levied  on the
5The  need  to  integrate  trade  taxes  with  domestic  taxes  in  a  common  framework
has  also  been  argued  in  Shalizi  and  Squire  (1989)  and  Linn  and  Wetzel  (1989).-9-
customs  duty-inclusive  price. Tables  1 through  5  report  the  use  of those  (and
other)  instruments  in  Bangladesh,  Malawi,  Nepal,  Tanzania  and  Uganda  which,  with
per  capita  incomes  of $160,  $160,  $160,  $180  and  $260  respectively  in  1987,  are
among  the  poorest  low  income  countries. 6 It  may  be seen  that  the  sales  tax  on
imports  is  a significant  revenue  source  even  in the  three  sub-Saharan  African
countries  where import  taxes  do not loom as large  as in the two South  Asian
countries.
9.  The  tables  allow  the  following  important  points  to  be  made. First,  even
the poorest  countries  use (at  least)  two  different  policy  instruments  to tax
imports,  a feature  that has considerable  sigr  ficance.  This point may be
illustrated  using  a  simple  example.  Suppose  that  the  c.i.f.  price  of  an  imported
good  in  local  currency  is  100. The  customs  duty  is  20%  and  the  sales  tax  which
is  levied  on the  customs  duty-inclusive  price  as  well  as on  domestic  production
c.f  the good is 10%.  Assuming  the  absence  of nontariff  import  licensing,  the
price  that  domestic  producers  can  charge  for  the  good  is the  c.i.f.  price
plus customs  duty,  or 120.  In this  example,  the  customs  duty  is a measure  of
the subsidy  extended  by the incentive  system  to producers. Thp customs  duty
also raises  the  price of the good to the  user above  its international  price
(from  100  to  120),  providing  the  basis  for  the  standard  observation  that  a  tariff
is a subsidy  to a domestic  producer  financed  by a tax  on the  user.  Since  the
tax component of the customs duty raises the price to users of domestic
production  as well as imports,  while its subsidy  component  applies  only to
domestic  production,  the  tax  revenue  from  users  exceeds  the  outlay  on  the  subsidy
to  producers;  for  this  reason,  the  tariff  is  revenue-raising.  The  customs  duty,
however,  is  not  the  only  tax  on  users  of the  good. That  is  given  by the  customs
6World  Bank (1989a).- 10  -
Table 1.  Composition if Indirect Tax Revenue in Bangladesh, 1987/88 a/
Tax Base  Imported  Domestic
Tax Type  Goods  Goods  Total
Customs Duty  37.8  37.8
Sales Tax  12.4  - 12.4
Excise Duty  - 26.8  26.8
Total  50.2  26.8  77.0
a/  Figures are percent of total tax revenue.
Notes:
1.  The customs duty is levied on the c.i.f. value of imports.  The sales
tax, which  applies only  to imports, is  levied on the customs  duty-
inclusive value.
2.  The  excise  duty  is levied on  the ex-factory price  of  domestically
produced goods.- 11  -
Table 2.  Composition of Indirect Tax Revenue in Malawi, 1988 a/
Tax Base  Imported  Domestic
Tax Type  Goods  Goods  Total
Import Duties  17.8  - 17.8
Surtax  13.7  20.2  33.9
Excise Duty  - 3.5  3.5
Total  31.5  23.7  55.2
a/  Figures are percent of total tax revenue.
Notes:
1.  The import duty is levied on the c.i.f. value of imports.
2.  The  excise  duty  is  levied on  the ex-factory price  of  domestically
produced goods.
3.  The surtax is levied on the import duty-inclusive price of imports and the
excise duty-inclusive ex-factory price of domestically produced goods.- 12 -
Table 3. Composition of Indirect Tax Revenue in Nepal, 1988/89 a/
Tax Base  Imported  Domestic
Tax Type  Goods  Goods  Total
Import Duty  35.7  - 35.7
Excise Tax  0.7  13.6  14.3
Sales Tax  11.0  11.8  22.8
Total  47.4  25.4  72.8
/  Figures are percent of total tax revenue.
Notes:
1.  The import duty is levied on the c.i.f. value of imports.  There is a two-
tiered structure  with only the  first slab  applying to imports  from India  and
both the first and second slabs applying to imports from other countries.
2.  The excise duty is levied on the ex-factory price for domestic goods.
It applies to imports and domestic goods at the same rate.
3.  The sales tax is levied on the excise and import  duty inclusive  c.i.f.
value  for  imports and the excise tax-inclusive ex-factory price  for
domestic goods.  It applies to import and domestic goods at the same
rate.
4.  Sales tax revenue collected from imported  inputs is  reported as revenue
from domestic goods, so that the 11 percent share reported above is an
underestimate of sales tax collected from imports.- 13 -
Table 4.  Composition of Indirect Tax Revenue in Tanzania, 1988/89 a/
Tax Base  Imported  Domestic
Tax Type  Goods  Goods  Total
Import Duty  18.6  - 18.67
Excise Tax
Sales Tax  17.2  55.6  72.8
Total  35.8  25.4  91.4
a/  Figures ax- percent of total tax revenue.
Notes:
1.  The import duty is levied on the c.i.f. value of imports.
2.  The sales tax is levied on the import-duty inclusive  value of imports and
the ex-factory  price of domestically  produced goods.  It treats imports  and
domestically produced goods in a symmetric  way.
3.  An  excise  tax  that  applied  to  both  domestic  and  imported  goods was
introduced in 1989/90.  Revenue figures are not as yet available for that
year.- 14 -
Table 5.  Composition of Indirect Tax Revenue in Uganda, 1988/89 a/
Tax Base  Imported  Domestic
Tax Type  Goods  Goods  Total
Import Duty  17.7  - 17.7
Excise Duty  - 10.9  10.9
Sales Tax k/  12.0  27.9  39.9
Total  29.7  38.8  68.5
a/  Figures are percent cf tax revenue.
k/  Imports were subject to a higher rate of sales tax.
Notes:
1.  The import duty is levied on the c.i.f. value of imports.
2.  The excise duty is levied on the ex-factory price of domestic goods.
3.  The sales tax  is levied on the import-duty  inclusive  c.i.f.  value of imports
and the excise-duty inclusive ex-factory price of domestic goods.  There
were a number of items for  which the sales tax rate  on imports exceeded tnat
on the corresponding domestic product.  It is understood however  that a
recent change has led to symmetric treatment of domestically produced and
imported goods.- 15 -
duty plus the sales tax, which together raise the price from 100 to 132, (the
latter figure being arrived at by  adding  10% to the customs duty-inclusive
price).  Hence, the tax orn  the user of the good is 32.
10.  The example suggests that the two instruments could  be used to further
the two objectives of providing protection and raising revenue.  Provided, as
in the  example and in fact in  Nepal and  Tanzania (see  Tables 3 and 4), that the
sales tax/VAT applies at an equal rate to imports  and domestic production, the
customs duty may be seen as playing a priniarily  protective role, with revenuic
objectives being  met by the customs duty togetner  with the sales tax/VAT.  Thus,
the  level and structure  of customs duties should be  set with  reference to
whatever protection objectives  are deemed  by tile  analyst to  be supportable.  The
sales tax/VAT can then be set at a level that, together with the customs duty,
satisfies the government's revenue requirements.
11.  Second,  although  the  excise  tax  features  separately  in  all  the
countries, it  may be thought  of as being a combination of both the customs duty
as well as the sales tax.  This is  because it  has revenue raising and  protective
aspects as well.  The first is oovious.  In Nepal (see  Table 3), for example,
it has  a purely revenue-raising function.  The second may be  seen from its
operation in Malawi and Uganda, (see  Tables 2 and 5) where the excise duty, by
applying to domestic production only, subtracts  from the  protection afforded by
import duties.  This effect could be reproduced by adjusting import duties and
by offsetting the revenue impact by adjusting the surtax/sales tax.
12.  Third, faced  with an array of duties and surcharges on imports, it is
sometimes tempting  to recommend that  they  be consolidated into  a single levy  for
administrative  simplicity.  The  above analysis  shows that  this would  be  a
mistake.  Thus, customs duties that apply to imports alone fulfil a different- 16 -
role  from  sales  taxes  that  apply  to  imports  as  well  as domestic  production.  As
mentioned earlier,  the two instruments  are aimed at two objectives,  viz.,
protection  and revenue-raising. Since  both instruments  are in use in the
poorect countries  and, a fortiori,  elsewhere,  consolidation  would result  in
giving  up one instrument  and reduce  the  possibility  of treating  tariffs  and
taxes  in  a consistent  way.
IV.  THE  DESIGN  OF TAXES-CUM-TARIFFS
13.  The simple  example  of Section  III  showed  that
*  the  difference  between  the  producer  price  and  the  world  price
of a good is  the  subsidy  to producers,  while
*  the  difference  between  the  consumer  price  and  the  world  price
of a good  is  the  tax  on  consumers.
This  allows  us to identify  the  customs  duty  with  the  producer  subsidy  and  the
customs  duty-plus-sales  tax  with  the  consumer  tax. 7
14.  This section  develops  some basic  principles  of coordinated  tax ard
tariff  design  with  a view to clarifying  ideas  as  well as providing  a point  of
reference  towards  which  reforms  may  be directed. We first  consider  the  wedge
between  producer  prices  and  world  prices  introduced  by customs  duties  and  then
7It  will  be recalled  that  the  shadow  price,  or social  opportunity  cost,  of
a traded  good  for a small  economy  is the  world  price,  adjusted  for  trade  and
transport  margins.  Hence the above  statement  has the appealing  property  of
measuring  the  producer  and  consumer  distortions  introduced  by the  tax-cum-tariff
system  vis-a-vis  social  opportunity  costs. While  traded  goods  are the  primary
focus  of tariff  reform  analysis,  it is  clear  that  changes  in taxes  and tariffs
consequent  on policy reform  will affect  nontraded  goods as well.  It may
therefore  be  noted,  paralleling  the  description  for  traded  goods,  that  the  wedge
introduced  between producer prices and shadow prices of  nontraded goods
corresponds  to a subsidy,  while  that  between  consumer  prices  and  shadow  prices
of nontraded  goods  corresponds  to a tax.- 17 -
turn to the wedge between consumer  prices and world rrices caused by the
combined  operation  of customs  duties  and  sales  taxes/VAT.
Producer  Prices  and  World  Prices
15.  A classical  argument  in favor  of wedges  between  producer  prices  and
world  prices  is  provided  by the infant  industry  argument. 8 A  variant  of this
runs  as follows. It  is  argued  that  the  volume  of  gross  output  confers  "learning
by doing"  type  benefits. These  eventually  lower  costs  of  production  and  allow
the industry  to become  competitive  in the future. The argument  is therefore
intertemporal:  the economy  incurs  the costs  of industrial  promotion  today  in
return  for  benefits  in terms  of higher  productivity  tomorrow. However,  this
does not necessarily  translate  into an argument  for  government  intervention.
Thus,  if  private  firms  can  invest  in  high  cost  production  in  the  early  years  and
appropriate  the  benefits  of  higher  productivity  in later  years,  no intervention
is  necessary. Institutional  restrictions  on  appropriability  and  capital  market
imperfections  may  however  preclude  such  arrangements  from  being  made. Economic
theory  would  then  argue  for  intervention  in  labor  and  capital  markets  to  correct
those distortions,  without restricting  trade in any way. 9 However, the
administrative  capacity  to identify  and  extend  subsidies  in factor  markets  may
be lacking in developing  countries.  While this might suggest a welfare-
inferior  policy  of production  subsidies  extending  to all  production  whether  for
domestic  sales  or  exports,  it  is in  practice  the  case  that  developing  countries
find it easier  to assist  their  producers  via an even worse  policy.  This of
course is tariff  protection  which encourages  only domestic  production  and
8For  a detailed  account,  see  Corden  (1974).
9For a careful  statement  of the appropriate  qualifications,  see Baldwin
(1969).- 18 -
discriminates against exports.  Its  widespread  use may be explained  with respect
to its revenue-raising feature as well as the advantage of extending assistance
to favored *;onstituencies  in a relatively inconspicuous  way.10
16.  The infant industry argument has also been seen to encounter certain
difficulties in  practice.  A recent  Bank report on trade  policy reform observed
that  "experience with  protection policies and  their general outcome  in the
majority of developing countries suggests that infant industry arguments are
generally  used  as  a  rationale  by  politically  powerful  protection-seeking
industries,  without  any  serious  consideration  of  whether  and  under  what
conditions the economic benefits of the protection will  exceed its economic
costs.  Thus the policies seldom recognize that if the initial economic costs
are  to be  offset,  the  learning-by-doing benefits  (weighted for  risks  and
discounted for the opportunity cost of the capital invested) must appear in a
period of, say, five to seven years."' 1 The report goes on to state that for
these and  associated reasons,  "the World  Bank has  usually recommended  that
protection not be given to support  irndustries".
Structure of Protection
17.  In practice, advisors on tariff design will typically be faced with
import  tariffs that are  "justified" via  a combination  of learning-by-doing
arguments unaddressed by other, more targeted policies, effective lobbying by
special interest groups with no particular claim to  "infancy" and political
imperatives to keep subsidies  hidden (as  is the case with tariffs) rather than
'Olt is recognized that the adi.iinistrative  capacity  to extend domestic
subsidies  as  part of an  industrial promotion policy as opposed to export-
discouraging tariff policies will vary across countries.
llSee  World Bank (1989).- 19  -
transparent.'?  Since evidence on learning-by-doing and related externalities
across  sectors  is notoriously  elusive, governments  experience  considerable
difficulty  in  identifying potentially  successful  sectors  and  products  for
special encouragement.  Economists  have then  recommended that  assistance  be made
uniform, on the grounds either that, in the absence of compelling evidence to
the contrary, learning effects might as well be assumed to be roughly the same
across sectors, or that a uniform structure  of assistance is less  vulnerable to
special pleading.  13  Higher timebound assistance may be provided for a few
selected sectors where there are demonstrable learning externalities.
Level of Protection
18.  It will be recognized that the above arguments on the structure of
protection  would  be  relevant  in  arriving  at  a  judgment,  not  only  on  the
structure of assistance as discussed above, but on  its level as well.  One
argument,  due  to  Little,  Scitovsky  and  Scott,  sees  the  need  for  special
assistance to  manufacturii  as deriving from the  excess of the  market wage over
the real cost of labor due to labor market distortions and savings constraints
on the economy. 
14 Thus, if  wage costs as a proportion of gross value added  were
on average 15 percent and the real cost of labor 50 percent of the market wage
(which is likely to be a generous allowance), the extent to which value added
should be assisted is of the order of 5 to 10 percent.  The authors further
argue that in the least developed countries, if the wages of unskilled labor
12We  ignore  here the  departures  from free trade that  may be justified  by the
"new" trade theory.  Their relevance for developing cotntries remains to be
established.  See, for example, Srinivasan (1989).
13For  a  derivation  of  the  relationship  between  learning-by-doing and
production subsidies, see  Mitra (1989). The relationship  between structures  of
incentives and lobbying however remains to be demonstrated.
14See  Little, Scitovsky and Scott (1970).- 20 -
were as  high as  40 percent  of  value  added,  the  justifiable  level  of assistance
to value  added  could  be 20%.  While these  estimates  should  be regarded  as no
more  than  illustrative, given  the  considerable variation  in  country
circumstances  governing  the  relationship  between  market  wages  and  the  real  cost
of labor, they provide a  rough range within which the average level of
protective  tariffs  might  lie.  It  may  be noted  that  while  this  range  overlaps
that  reported  as being  characteristic  of  Bank  recommendations  (see  footnote  4),
the  latter  is somewhat  higher.
Summary  of Tariff  Recommendations
19.  The  discussion on  protective tariffs may  be  summarized in the
observation  that a uniform  tariff  at a level  not exceeding  10 to 15 percent
could  be  adopted as  an  acceptable rule  of  thumb  in  countries where
administrative  and  revenue  constraints  preclude  extensive  use  of  better  targeted
instruments.  While such a  structure  of incentives  discriminates  against
exports,  the  10 to 15%  range  is thought  by  practitioners  to  be low  enough  so  as
to  limit  the  extent  of discrimination.  The  discrimination  may  be  partly  offset
by granting  exporters  duty  free  access  to  intermediate  inputs.  Both  common  sense
and  experience  suggest  that  practical  schemes  that  give  effect  to  such  proposals
with regard  to imported  inputs  (duty  drawbacks,  exemptions,  bonded  warehouses,
duty free zones,  etc.)  are easier  to administer  when tariffs  are set  at low
levels. This  has two  significant  implications.
The  Treatment  of Intermediate  Inputs
20.  First,  access  to duty free imported  inputs  on the  part of exporters
implies  that  domestic  producers  of such  inputs  would  not  be able  to compete  if
they were to charge  duty-inclusive  prices.  Thus, for, example,  if garment
exporters can import fabrics free of customs duties, they would have no-21-
incentive  to  purchase  locally-produced  fabrics  at  duty-inclusive  prices. Hence
countries  have attempted  to allow  an "indirect"  exporter  such as the local
producer  of fabrics  to import  part of his input  requirements  free of customs
duty. This  would  offer  no protection  to  domestic  producers  of fabrics  on that
portion  of  their  sales  going  to  garment  exporters. If  successful,  however,  the
policy  could develop  backward  linkages  and deepen  the benefits  flowing  from
outward  orientation.
21.  Second,  the difficulty  of granting  duty free access  at high tariff
levels  implies  that  attempts  to  unify  tariffs  at levels  higher  than  the 10 to
15 percent  range  cannot  be part  of the  recommended  design. This  has  generated
the following  problem  to which  some recent  work  has  been addressed. Consider
a  situation  where  tariffs  on  final  goods  are  30%,  possibly  (although  this  is  not
necessary to the argument) as a  result of previous reform.  Tariffs on
intermediate  goods  entering  into  the  production  of  such  final  goods  are  low  and,
for  purposes  of this argument,  may  be taken  to be zero.  Effective  protection
to import-substituting  final goods is therefore  much higher than may be
"justified"  on learning-by-doing  or other grounds.  It is assumed  that,  for
reasons  not  usually  specified,  that  the  tariff  may not  be reduced  any  further.
Attention  must therefore  be directed  to indirect  ways in  which  protection  may
be reduced. Broadly  speaking,  two  kinds  of solutions  have  been offered. The
first,  due to Harberger  (1988),  observes  that an increase  in the tariff  on
intermediate  goods  would  be one  solution. 15 In fact,  if an intermediate  good
accounts  for  x  percent  of  the  value  of the  final  good  under  free  trade,  a tariff
on the  intermediate  good  at a level  (100/x)  times  30%  would  drive  the  effective
"5The  selective  review  by  Rajaram  (1989)  suggests  that  tariff  increases  on
intermediate  goods  have  been recommended  in certain  countries.- 22 -
protection on final goods to zero.  Since x <  100, this level of tariff on the
intermediate good would be higher than that on the final good.  Harborger does
not  in fact recommend that intermediate good tariffs be set at that level.
Instead, it is suggested that a uniform tariff on intermediate and final good
imports is likely to be a satisfactory compromise.  The second, due to Shalizi
and Squire (1989),  is to impose an additional domestic tax on the production of
final goods without raising the tariff on intermediate  goods.
22.  It may be observed that  both solutions are revenue-raising and do not
therefore have adverse budgetary consequences.  In fact, although this is not
mentioned in either paper, the extra revenue could be used if necessary to meet
demands for adjustment assistance to final good producers adversely affected  by
the reduction of protection.  We return to this point in Section V.  The first
solution, by unifying the tariff structure at the "unalterable" level of 30
percent,  runs  the considerable  risk of  making  it  difficult for  developing
country administrators to implement schemes allowing exporters  duty free access
to intermediate inputs: the inducemencs to "leakage" from  bonded warehouses and
the likelihood of fraudulent claims for duty drawback are too great.  It also
offers considerable protection to domestic production of intermediate goods.
In contrast, the  second solution,  by not raising intermediate  good tariffs,  does
not complicate duty exemption procedures for exports.  However, it offers no
protection to intermediate goods  and does not unify tariffs at a common level.
Under this scheme, there are two sets of tariffs:  a higher uniform rate for
final goods and a lower uniform rate (possibly zero) for intermediate goods,
complemented by an additional levy on domestic production of final goods.16
16It  may  be  noted  that  this  would  be  an  excise  tax  with  negative
consequences for protection of final goods.  See paragraph 11 in Section III.- 23 -
23.  It is a feature of both solutions that the protection of intermediate
goods does not seemn  to  be an issue.  Harberger sees the tariff  on intermediates
principally as an instrument  to adjust the  effective protectiorn  to final goods,
while  it  is  implicit  in  Shalizi  and  Squire  that  the  need  to  protect
intermediates is not seen as important in the sub-Saharan African countries
under discussion.  If therefore there are no particular grounds for protecting
intermediate  goods,  and  the  only  constraint  is  the  presence  of  minimum
"unalterable" tariffs on final goods, hcw is tariff design to be modified?  It
has been pointed out that the uniformity argument is based on the absence of
compelling empirical evidence  on sectorally differentiated learning-by-doing  or
externality arguments.  If protection of intermediates is  then not relevant, it
is preferable to have  low protection for final goods and no protection for
intermediates.  If this cannot be achieved  by lowering  final goods tariffs (but
see paragraph 24), then, faced  with the real possibility of injury to exporters
and a consequent threat to outward orientation, it would be desirable to have
an additional domestic tax to offset the high effective protection to final
goods that would otherwise result.  On the other hand, if intermediates are
deserving of  protection, their  tariff rates should  be increased  to 10-15%  levels
and an excise tax imposed if necessary on domestic production of final goods as
well.  The answer to  whether intermediate  tariffs should be raised from zero to
10-15% therefore turns  on whether intermediates  are to  be protected in their  own
right.
24.  It may also be noted that both Harberger and Shalizi-Squire assume
without further discussion that while the reduction of final good tariffs is
ruled out, it  is possible to increase intermediate good tariffs or to levy
additional domestic taxes on final goods respectively.  Before endorsing those- 24 -
solutions, it  is  worth  enquiring what  exactly is  the  basis  for  the
unalterability  of the  final  good  tariff. If,  for  example,  it  may  not  be  reduced
because  domestic  producers  of final  goods  wish to maintain  a minimum  level  of
protection,  then those  producers  may  be equally  successful  in  blocking  either
of the  above  proposals  which  adopt  "indirect"  methods  to  reduction  of  that  level
of protection.  In that  case,  it  may  be  no more  difficult  to  press  directly  for
the  reduction  of nominal  tariff  rates  on final  goods.
Consumer  Prices  and  World  Prices
25.  We turn  next to the  wedge  between  consumer  prices  and world  prices,
given  by the  customs  duty-plus-sales  tax. The  motivation  for  this  wedge  in  the
absence of the lump-sum  taxes of classical  economic  analysis is to raise
revenue.  This  has  the  consequence  that  the  government's  revenue  needs  determine
the  average  level  of  this  wedge,  while  standard  considerations  of  efficiency  and
equity  guide  its  structure.
26.  In a one-consumer  economy  with an assumed  absence  of lump-sum  tax
instruments  it  is  desirable  to  raise  revenue  by taxing  more  (less)  heavily  goods
that  are relatively  complementary  (substitutable)  with leisure,  where  leisure
is  understood  to  represent  an  untaxed  time  endowuent. 17 Thus,  if  all  goods  were
equally  substitutable  for  leisure,  a uniform  tax  structure  would  be desirable.
In the  more realistic  many-consumer  economy,  the determinants  of the desired
structure  of taxation  depends  on two  factors:  (i)  substitution  possibilities
with leisure as before, and (ii) variations  in consumption  patterns  among
different  consumers  and income  groups.  This second  consideration  introduces
17The  result  follows  from  a  desire  to  tax  the  consumer's  endowment. It is
common  to  choose  leisure  as the  endowment  good. It  could  equally  be interpreted
as nonmarket  time. For  a  more  careful  statement  of  these  conditions,  see  Stern
(1987).- 25 -
distributional considerations into the analysis in an essential way.  Thus,
uniform taxation  would be desirable if all goods were equally substitutable  for
leisure and if there  were no variation in  consumption patterns across different
households.  These conditions  are  implausibly stringent.  But  they can be
relaxed if other instruments are available to the government.  Thus, if there
is  a  well-functioning  income  support  scheme  and  income  taxation  that  can
appropriately target the basis of differences  among households, it  may be shown
that uniform taxation may under certain circumstances continue to be desirable
even in a many-consumer economy.
27.  Literally  interpreted,  these  prescriptions  would call  for  a  complicated
structure of tax rates that could not be administered effectively.  However,
analysis comparing optimal and uniform tax structures 18 and country experience
suggest that broadly acceptable outcomes may be obtained by implementing the
following set of recommendations.
Structure of ConsUmDtion Taxes
28.  First, it would be desirable to tax consumption over as large a part
of  the economy as administrative constraints permit and to do so at a uniform
rate.  This  does  not  discriminate  on  the  basis  of  complementarity  and
substitutability  relationships  with  leisure  endowments  but  since  such
information is extremely difficult to obtain, it is not uncommon to assume that
all goods are equally substitutable with leisure.  The situation is somewhat
analogous to the earlier one  where, in  the  absence of evidence  on differentiated
learning effects  across infant industries, it  was assumed that they are equally
strong.  However, given the limited reach of taxation in developing countries,
18See, for example, the calculations reported in Ebrahimi and Heady (1988)
and Mitra (1990).- 26 -
the uniform tax will not in practice apply to all sectors at the same rate.
Agriculture  will be exempt from taxation  except  for its  purchase of taxed inputs
as will be enterprises in the informal sector and many services.  Once again,
the situation  varies across developing countries.  The middle income countries
of Latin America generally administer a value added tax on consumption that
extends  through  the  retail  level  to  the point  of  final  consumption.  In
contrast, the Asian countries with the exception of Korea and the Philippines,
and the low income countries  of sub-Saharan  Africa administer  a VAT that extends
only to tne manufacturers' level.
29.  Second,  given the  absence  of  well functioning  income  support  mechanisms
and the undeveloped nature of the income tax, especially in the lower income
countries, it is necessary to allow exemptions and some differentiation in the
rate structure of indirect taxes in order to accommodate distributional goals.
Thus,  the exemption of nonmarketed  food in particular ensures that the tax
system has distributionally acceptable consequences.  However, the requirement
that the indirect tax system not be  expected to serve too many objectives,
together with administrative considerations, dictate that a proliferation of
rates be avoided.
30.  Reference has already been made above to the desirability of taxing
consumption.  This is done under the  VAT by allowing  firms credit for taxes  paid
not only on raw materials but on capital goods as  well.19 This form of tax also
19VAT  systems  which disallow  credit for  taxes  paid on capital  goods--the so-
called "income type" VATs are generally not used.  Exceptions among LDCs are
Argentina and Peru and, to some extent, Turkey.  Income type VATs by definition
credit taxes paid on capital goods purchases only when the latter depreciate:
their implementation therefore requires maintaining depreciation accounts.  In
practice, however, the depreciation provisions used in Argentina and Peru are
very generous.  In contrast, VATs of the "gioss  product" type, as practiced in
Finland and Morocco, do not allow tax credit on depreciation.- 27 -
allows exporters  refunds on  taxes paid  on capital goods, thereby enhancing
competitiveness and allowing the benefits of outward orientation to be more
fully reaped.
31.  The ensuing discussion  makes a distinction  between exemption and  zero-
rating and requires a brief explanation.  Exempted sectors, by not being part
of a VAT, do not pay taxes on their output.  By the same token, they cannot
claim credit for taxes paid on their inputs.  Hence exempted sectors are taxed
on their inputs rather than on their outputs,  whereas sectors under the  VAT are
taxed on their output rather than on their inputs.  Zero-rated sectors, on the
other hand, are exempted from taxation on both their inputs as well as on their
outputs.  Zero-rating therefore offers a precise way of according relief from
taxation.
32.  The VAT used by most countries either has a zero rate or an exemption
applying  to necessities, a standard rate for the majority of  sectors and a
higher rate applicable to luxury items and those goods whose consumption the
authorities wish to discourage.  Table 6 provides some examples.  It shows the
main rates of VAT and additional rates applying to a subset of goods in the EEC
countries (which  have the longest experience of using VAT), other European
countries,  selected  Latin  American  countries,  and  in  New  Zealand,  Taiwan
(China),  Indonesia,  and Korea.  The rates shown  are those that apply to domestic
sales;  virtually all of  the  countries zero-rate  exports.  The largest  number of
different rates is seven (in Belgium),  but two or three rates are more common.
In Asia, Indonesia has a single rate  while Korea and Taiwan, China which began
with single rates now have three rates.
33.  All  the  countries  listed  in  the  table  have  additional  taxes  on
particular commodities.  These are separate from the VAT and are therefore not- 28 -
Table 6.  The Rate Structure of VAT in Selected Countries
Main  Other  Number of
Rate  VAT Rates  Rates
Argentina  18  9  2
Austria  20  10, 32  3
Belgium  19  1, 6, 17, 25, 33, 0  7
Denmark  22  0  2
France  18.6  2.1, 4.5, 5.7, 33.3  5
Germany  14  7, 2  3
Greece  18  3, 6, 36  4
Hungary  25  15  2
Indonesia  10  - 1
Ireland  25  2.2, 10, 0  4
Israel  15  6.5  2
Italy  18  2, 9, 38, 0  5
Korea  10  2, 3.5  3
Luxembourg  12  3, 6  3
Netherlands  20  6, 0  3
New Zealand  10  - 1
Norway  20  11.11  2
Portugal  16  8, 30  4
Spain  12  6, 33, 0  3
Sweden  23.46  3.95, 12.87, 0  4
Taiwan, China  5  15, 25  3
United Kingdom  15  0  2
Source:  A. A. Tait, Value added tax:  International Practice and
Problems, (International  Monetary Fund:  Washington, D.C.
(1988).- 29 -
subject to refund.  In the European Community these additional taxes are mainly
in the form of excise taxes on tobacco, alcohol, gasoline and diesel oil.  The
rates vary widely from one country to another, but are often higher than the
VAT levied at either 10 percent of 20 percent on goods that are regarded as
luxuries.  In Korea, there is a Special Excise Tax that is levied at rates
between 5 percent and 100 percent on selected goods.
34.  Thus, distributional objectives may be accommodated through a second
or "luxury" rate within the value added tax or by imposing excises on luxuries
entering final consumption, together  with items such as cigarettes, alcohol and
petroleum products. 20 Once again, the extent of differentiation in the rate
structure must  be  chosen  in the  light of  internationa'l  experience and  the
country's administrative  capabilities.  However, it is important to ensure that
the standard and luxury  rates apply symmetrically  to domestic production and to
imports, thus ensuring that the task of protection is left to customs duties.
Summary of Tax  Recommendations
35.  The discussion  on the  wedge between consumer prices and world prices,
may lie  summarized in the observation that this should be set (i) at a single
rate for all transactions that the tax administration is able to reach, with
exemptions for items such as nonmarketed food that are consumed  by the poorest
and (ii) at higher rates for luxuries and other goods whose consumption the
government wishes  to discourage, with  the  extent  of differentiation being
dictated by administrative capacity.
20International opinion  is  somewhat  divided  as  to  what  framework  is
appropriate for the tax treatment of luxuries and other goods whose consumption
the government wishes to discourage.  One option is the incorporation  of luxury
rates on income-elastic g.-'ods  within the  VAT, with additional sumptuary  excises
on selected  items.  A  second option  is the use of a  single rate VAT with
sumptuary excises outside the  VAT.- 30 -
36.  It has already been mentioned that the wedge between consumer prices
and world prices to  which the above discussion refers is  brought about through
the operation of the customs duty plus the sales tax/VAT.  Recall the earlier
example of paragraph 9 where the c.i.f. pri.. of an import in local currency is
100, the customs duty is 20% and the sales tax 10%.  Since the latter tax is
levied on the customs duty-inclusive price (120) rather than the world price,
consumer prices  could be  raised by  a uniform proportion  over world prices
essentially only through a uniform rate of customs duty (which  raises producer
prices by an equal proportion over world prices) and a uniform rate of sales
tax/VAT (which  raises consumer  prices  by an  equal proportion  over  world prices).
That proportion would be  given in this example by  (1.2 x 1.1)  - 1  - 0.  32.
Luxury rates  or sumptuary excises would  apply on  top of this  for selected
commodities.  This consideration further underlines the importance of adopting
an integrated  perspective in determining a desiralble  structure of customs duty
and sales tax/VAT.
Exports
37.  The summaries in paragraphs 19 and 35 did not pay detailed attention
to the tax treatment of exports, except to suggest that inputs entering export
production  not be  liable for  customs duty or value  added  tax.  There  are
circumstances,  outlined  below, when  the  taxation  of exports  is justified.
However, to the extent that exports are already implicitly taxed via import
tariffs, these arguments should  be used with considerable care.
38.  First, a  classical argument  is provided by  inelasticity in world
demand for a country's exports.  As the  above formulation  makes clear,  however,
the relevant elasticity is not that of world demand as a whole, but the demand
for the  country's exports.  Competition among countries ensures that the lat-ter- 31 -
will usually be considerably  more elastic than the former,  weakening the
argument  for  significant  export  taxation.  It is  also  necessary  to  remember  that
long  run  demand  elasticities substantially exceed  short  run  demand
elasticities.  21
39.  A second  argument  for  export  taxation  is  provided  by the  existence  of
a  quota  on  a  country's  exports  or  because  of "voluntary"  export  restraints.  Its
purpose is to tax quota  profits  and it should  be set at a level that  makes
exports  equal  the  quota  in question. Examples  are  provided  by the  Multifiber
Arrangement  and  various  commodity  agreements.
40.  A  third argument  for export  taxation  arises  from restrictions  on
domestic  tax  possibilities.  Thus,  constraints  on the  possibilities  of taxing
agricultural  land  or income  can  justify  the  taxation  of agricultural  exports. 22
These  can  either  be  explicit  or  be  implemented  via  agricultural  marketing  boards
that  set  prices  received  by farmers  below  international  prices.
41.  It is noted in the  World Development  Report  1988 that  export  taxes
were  used  in  at least  fifty  three  of  the  seventy  four  countries  singled  out  for
a study  of such  taxes. The  evidence  also  suggests  that  they  are  set  at levels
considerably  in  excess  of those  justified  on grounds  of demand  inelasticity  or
the  need  to substitute  for  unavailable  land  or agricultural  income  taxes.
21These  observations  are  confirmed  by Imran  and  Duncan  (1988)  who  present
the  relevant  information  for  cocoa,  tea,  coffee  and  natural  rubber.
22For  a review  of the  comparison  between  export  taxes  and land  taxes,  see
Skinner  (1990).- 32 -
Optimal  Policies  vs. Rules  of Thumb 23
42.  Before concluding  this section,  it must be pointed out that the
prescriptions  outlined  here are be seen,  not as characterizations  of optimal
policies,  but  as rules  of  thumb  for  policy  making  that  yield  broadly  acceptable
outcomes with  regard to  efficiency,  equity and  protection,  while being
implementable  with  the  administrative  resources available to  developing
countries.  In  contrast,  Harberger (1988)  has  attempted to justify the
optimality  of  uniform  tariffs. In  what  follows,  we examine  his  basic  argument.
43.  Harberger's  argument  in favor  of uniform  tariffs  is based on the
notion  that  this  guarantees  efficiency. The reason  this  argument  is somewhat
difficult  to assess  is that,  notwithstanding  references  to "the  protectionist
motive",  the  paper  nowhere  states  in  what  form  one  should  think  about  protection
either  as an objective  or as  a constraint.
44.  The  argument in favor of uniform tariffs is motivated by  the
observation  that "the  uniform  tariff  goes  on to  point  out the  absurdity  (from
an economic  point  of  view)  of  paying  a  domestic  resource  cost  (DRC)  of  22  pesos
per  dollar  in  one  place,  of 16  pesos  per  dollar  in  another,  and  of 10  pesos  per
dollar  in a third  place--all  being cases  of import  substitution..  .A country
gains  by  moving  towards  equalization  of the  domestic  resource  costs  of  different
import  substitute  activities." Since  the  measure  of the  DRC  used  here,  viz.,
factor  use in  each  activity  evaluated  at  market  prices  compared  to  value  added
at international  prices.  is equal,  in a standard  trade  model,  to one  plus the
effective  rate  of  protection  (ERP?),  the  above  is equivalent  to arguing  that
23This  subsection  relates  the  present  paper  to  some  earlier  literature  and
is somewhat  more demanding.  Readers  prepared  to accept  the conclusions  of
paragraph  47 might  omit it  without  disadvantage.- 33 -
unequal  ERPs  are  undesirable,  from  which  the  optimality  of  uniform  ERPs  follows
directly.
45.  The  difficulty  with  this  argument  is  the  following.  It  has  been  shown
by  Srinivasan  and  Bhagwati  (1978),  for  example,  that  DRCs  evaluated  at market
prices  of factors  have no welfare  significance  in a distorted  economy.  The
argument  is  straightforward.  With  distortions,  the  real  opportunity  cost  to  the
economy  of  employing  or  withdrawing  a  factor  from  a  particular  activity  is  given
by its  marginal  product  in  that  activity  evaluated,  in the  case  of tradeables,
at their world prices and not their  market  prices.  To make statements  on
welfare  in  such  an  economy  it is  therefore  necessary  to  use  the  real  opportunity
costs  of  factors  in  calculating  the  DRCs. Since  only  DRCs  calculated  using  the
real  opportunity  costs  of factors  have  any  welfare  significance,  and  since  this
is not the case for  DRCs calculated  at  market  prices,  which  latter  equal  one
plus the  ERP,  Srinivasan  and  Bhagwati  argue  that  "it  is  best therefore  to  drop
the terminology  and concept  of ERPs altogether  from cost-benefit  analysis."
46.  Harberger's  claim  on the  superiority  of uniform  ERPs  may however  be
established  using a  different  line of argument  that makes the protection
constraint  on economic  policy  making  explicit.  If the objective  is (i) to
extend special treatment to a  subset of  sectors in the  economy (e.g.,
manufacturing)  compared  to the rest of the economy and  (ii) to preserve
uniformity  of treatment  within that targeted  subset,  a form of protection
constraint  due to  Bertrand  (1972),  it is  clear  that  policy  interventions  would
discriminate  in  favor  of  the  subset  compared  to  those  outside  but  not  within  it.
If  there  were  no  economic  cost  to  providing  subsidies,  i.e.,  if  the  latter  could
be costlessly  raised  through  lump  sum taxation,  the above  objective  would  be
achieved by  a  uniform subsidy to producers within the  targeted sector.- 34 -
Furthermore,  this  uniformity  would  lead  to  effective  rates  of  protection  if the
aim were to encourage  value added,  i.e., gross output  net of intermediate
inputs, in  the  targeted sectors. However, the  argument refers not  to
distortionary  tariffs  at all  but to  production  subsidies  financed  by lump  sum
taxation. In  particular,  as pointed  out in  Mitra (1987),  if  subsidies  may  not
be raised  except  via  distortionary  taxation,  the  economic  costs  of the  latter
would  have  to  be taken  into  account,  undermining  the  uniformity  argument.  Since
revenue  and  administrative  constraints  preclude  most  developing  countries  from
assisting  local  production  via subsidies  and since  most tax  administrators  do
not  have access  to lump  sum  instruments  to finance  those  subsidies,  it  must  be
concluded  that  this  special  case  is  of  virtually  no interest  for  policy. On the
other hand, as argued in the present  paper,  Harberger's  recommendations  on
uniform tariffs, together with uniform indirect taxes, if combined with
exemption  of nonmarketed  food  and  supplementary  taxes  on luxuries,  though  not
optimal,  are likely  to be reasonably  good rules  of thumb  in a wider  class  of
situations.  24
47.  It is now generally  known that  uniformity  is not optimal  except  in
very special  cases. The  above  discussion  implies  that  the  value  of analytical
tax-cum-tariff  studies  for policy  making would be considerably  enhanced  if
attention  were to  be paid to identifying  circumstances  under  which  the  pursuit
of  uniformity  of  taxes-cum-tariffs,  supplemented  by  higher  taxes  on  domestically
produced  and imported  luxuries,  would  be seriously  inappropriate. Thus,  for
example,  the  earlier  discussion  of  this  section  focussed  on  weaknesses  in  income
support  mechanisms  and incoTne  taxation  as an important  reason  for introducing
24This is also the position  taken in Balassa (1989b)  in a paper that
synthesizes  disparate  literatures  into  a consistent  package  for  policy  makers.- 35 -
distributionally-oriented  differentiation  in  the  value  added  tax.  Recent
research  suggests  that  uniform  VAT  structures  may  also  be  seriously
inappropriate  in  economies  where  the  public  sector,  for  example,  is
characterized by extensive price controls. 25 The pursuit of appropriate rules
of  thumb  has  thus  made  more  progress  with  respect  to  the  design  of  tax
structures  compared to that  in  the  area of  simultaneous tariff-cum-tax  design. 26
V.  THE REFORM OF TAXES-CUM-TARIFFS
48.  Policy advisors are rarely in a position of being called upon  to
design a cuuntry's tax-cum-tariff  structure  de novo.  The  more typical  situation
is one where the anti-export bias of the trade regime is high on account of
import tariffs and quantitative restrictions  and must be reduced.  At the same
time,  revenue constraints  are typically acute, so  that accompanying fiscal
adjustments are necessary to  preserve macroeconomic stability. 27  '-low  could the
ideas on desirable structures  developed in Section  IV above  be used to  guide the
reform?
Nontariff Import Restrictions
49.  The relaxation and ultimate removal of quantitative restrictions and
import  licenses is  a standard  component  of trade liberalization. Countries  have
tried different schemes in this regard 28; to th,.  extent these involve the
25See  Heady and Mitra (1990).
26An attempt in this direction is contained in Mitra (1990).
27The raising  of tariffs that  are currently lower than the 10-15% range  but
are  called  for on  grourds  of protection  will  of  course usually  alleviate
conflicts with revenue goals.
28These are outlined in World Bank (1989b).- 36 -
replacement  of those  restrictions  by tariffs,  this  stage  of reform  is revenue-
enhancing.  Two points deserve mention here.  First, since quantitative
restrictions  axe  protective  in intent,  their  replacement  by tariffs  should  be
reflected  in  the  customs  duty  and  not  in  the  sales  tax/VAT  on imports. Second,
this  change  increases  the  dependence  of  public  revenue  on  tariffs  till  such  time
as  the  country reduces protection and  switches from  tariffs to  less
discriminatory  sources  of revenue  such  as the  sales  tax/VAT.
Tariff  Reduction
50.  Before  analyzing  the  consequences  of  reduction  of  protective  tariffs,
it  may be observed  that  an easy stage  of "reform"  is  provided  by the  lowering
of tariffs  that  are set  so high  that  their  lowering  would  raise  revenue. This
would also raise protection  for domestic import-competing  producers  while
reducing  protection,  in the  case  of intermediate  goods,  for  domestic  users  of
the  product.
Matching  Sales  Tax/VAT
51.  The integrated  approach  to tax-cum-tariff  analysis  suggests  that
protection  and  revenue  issues  arising  in  subsequent  tariff  reduction  be  handled
as follows.  It is desirable  to transfer  the role of protection  to customs
duties.  To that end, the sales  tax/VAT  on imports  and  domestic  transactions
should  be matched,  so that  both are taxed  at the same rate.  Customs  duties
which  are levied  on commodities  for  which  there  is no domestic  production  and
which are therefore  purely  revenue-raising  should  be brought  under the sales
tax/VAT.  29
29Since  there  is no domestic  production  of these  items,  there  will be no
revenue  collected  under  those  items  from  the  domestic  sales  tax. However,  this
does  nc- affect  the  principle  that  the  rate  applying  to these  items  under  the
sales tax  should  be the  same irrespective  of wheth3r  the source  of supply  is
imports  or possible  future  domestic  production.- 37 -
52.  It is recognized  that  the  matching  of the  sales  tax/VAT  with respect
to rates does not necessarily  imply  that the effective  rate,  defined  as the
revenue  collection  divided  by the base, will be the same for imports  and
domestic  production. This is  because  collection  costs  are  usually  higher  for
domestic  taxes compared  to trade taxes.  The World Development  Report  1988
reports  that  the  administrative  costs  of trade  and  excise  taxes  range  from  1  to
3 percent  of revenue  collected,  whereas  the  corresponding  figure  for  VATs can
be  as  high  as 5  percent. 30 What  is  relevant  in  switching  from  protec- e  customs
duties  to  a  VA',  however,  is  not  the  average  administrative  cost  reported  above,
but rather the marginal administrative  cost of collection;  no evidence  is
available  on the  extent  to  which these  differ  across  taxes.  Nevertheless,  it
is in practice  the case that  satisfactory  matching  of the  sales  tax/VAT  will
require  a concomitant  strengthening  in  domestic  tax  administration.
Adlustina  Taxes  for  Revenue
53.  To illustrate  the kinds of adjustments  that are necessitated  by
revenue  considerations,  it  proves  convenient  to  return  to  the  numerical  example
of paragraph  9. Recall  that  the  c.i.f.  price  of the  imported  good  was 100,  the
customs  duty 20%  and  the  sales  tax  10%,  so that  the  producer  price  was  120  and
the consumer  price was 132.  A  lowering  of the customs  duty by say, 50%,
reduces  the  producer  price  to  110. However,  since  sales  taxes  are  levied  on  the
customs  duty-inclusive  price,  this also  reduces  the  consumer  price  to 121 [G
110(1  +  0.1)].  But  protection  refers  to the  wedge  between  the  producer  price
and the  world  price  and should  not involve  reducing  consumer  prices  as well.
Hence reduction  of protection  per  se, interpreted  as a narrowing  of the  wedge
3OThe  corresponding  figure  for  personal  income  taxes  is  reported  to  be 10%.- 38 -
between producer prices and world prices, would be achieved by combining the
lowering of customs duties with an equal  upward adjustment of the sales tax/VAT
structure so as to restore the tax wedge between consumer prices and world
prices prevailing befoye  the tariff reduction.  In that case,  it would be
necessary  to simultaneously increase the rate of sales tax to 20%.  Since,
unlike the customs duty, the sales tax applies to imports as well as domestic
production, this combination of changes is revenue-enhancing.  Thus,  if the
import and  domestic  tax bases were  unchanged,  an assumption made here  for
expository convenience, the collection from customs duties and sales taxes on
imports  taken together  would be  unchanged (with  customs duty  collections falling
by  50% and sales tax collections rising by roughly 83%),.  If the sales tax
applies equally to domestic production, the revenue from this source increases
by 83%.  Lest this seem puzzling, recall that customs duties are a subsidy to
producers.  A  reduction  in those duties,  when accompanied  by  a  sales  tax
adjustment to maintain the revenue-raising wedge between consumer prices and
world prices, must therefore increase revenue.  From this revenue estimate,
however, must be subtracted, if any, the increased cost that is incurred in
collecting the extra sales tax/VAT revenue, net of the cost saving arising on
the customs side.  While unavailability of marginal collection costs precludes
these from  being quantified, it is  worth bearing in  mind that successful reform
will  require  a  reallocation of  resources across  the units  entrusted  with
administration of the different taxes.
54.  Readers  will  recognize  that a  somewhat extreme  example  is being
sketched here.  The subsidy implicit in  protective tariffs is  being lowered and
the sales tax increased by the full amount of that reduction.  But this serves
to bring out clearly the main point, which is that reduction of protection per- 39 -
se necessarily  requires  a coordinated  reform  of tariffs  and  domestic  indirect
taxes. If the  sales  tax/VAT  is thus  adjusted,  it  will  be possible  to  generate
extra revenue,  some of which could  be used to extend  adjustment  assistance,
preferably  through  the  budgetary  process,  to  producers  adversely  affected  by  the
tariff  reduction.
55.  It follows  from  the  above  argument  that  a smaller  upward  adjustment
in the  sales  tax/VAT  structure  will  suffice  to  make  the  reform  revenue-neutral.
Once  again,  for  purposes  of illustration,  if  the  domestic  sales  tax  base is  50%
higher  than  that  for imports,  it is easily  seen  that  the  sales  tax rate  would
have to increase  from  10%  to  around  14%-or  by 40%-to  offset  the  revenue  losses
from  tariff  reduction. 31 A larger  adjustment  than  the  above  would  of course  be
:equired  to raise the  revenue necessary to meet demands for adjustment
assistance  and  to take  into  account  any  differences  in  the  marginal  collection
costs  of sales  tax/VAT  compared  to  protective  customs  duties. 
32
Revenue  and  Protection  Constraints  on Reform
56.  The extent  to which  revenue  as opposed  to  protection  considerations
limit  the  reduction  of  protective  tariffs  depends  ultimately  on administrative
constraints  to  expansion  of the  domestic  tax  base. While  this  will  necessarily
vary from country  to country,  the following  general  point  may be made.  The
evidence  cited  earlier  in the  paper  shows  that  the  importance  of trade  taxes  in
public  revenue declines with  per  capita  income.  This  implies that
31If M is the import  base and D the  domestic  sales  tax  base,  pre-reform
revenue  equals  1.32M  +  l.lD.  If x is the sales  tax rate after the reform,
revenue  equals  (1  +  x)(l.lM  +  D).  Since  D - 1.5M,  the two  are  equal  and  the
reform  revenue-neutral  when x  - 0.142.
32Mexico  offers  an example  where the introduction  of a VAT three  years
before the 1983 trade reform allowed revenue  losses to be offset through
increases  in  domestic  indirect  taxes.- 40 -
administrative  constraints  to identification  of revenue  sources  alternative  to
trade  taxes  can  be expected  to  be most  acute  in  the  low  income  countries.  This
might encourage  the conclusion  that a reduction  of protective  tariffs  would
rapidly  encounter  revenue  constraints  in  such  countries.  Against  that,  however,
must be set the observation  that the low income  countries  do not have a
diversified  manufacturing  sector  and  therefore  that  many  of their  import  taxes
will  be  mainly  revenue-raising  rather than  protective.  Since  trade
liberalization  should  pertain  to  the  reduction  of protective  rather  than  purely
revenue-raising  tariffs,  with the latter being absorbed  within the sales
tax/vat,  the extent of revenue loss arising from this reduction  will be
considerably  smaller,  thus requiring  a more modest  offsetting  adjustment  in
domestic  tax  structures.
57.  The extent  to which  protection  considerations  themselves  limit  the
reduction  of protective  tariffs  depends  on the ability  of import-competing
producers  to preserve  the  tariff-induced  implicit  subsidy  enjoyed  by them  as
well as the other instruments  availabie  to the government.  Since existing
tariff  levels  in  many  countries  are  well in  excess  of the  recommended  range  of
10-15%,  it  is  clear  that  a  very  significant  reduction  in  protection  is  involved
in  moving  to an outward-oriented  development  strategy. Producers  will require
considerable  time  to adjust  to such  changes;  the  magnitude  of this  adjustment
is essentially  the same whether  protection  is reduced  by cutting  tariffs  on
final  goods,  raising  tariffs  on intermediate  goods  or  levying  taxes  on  domestic
production  of final  goods. The  desired  changes  could  therefore  be facilitated
by extending  other  forms  of assistance  to  them;  this  theme  is  further  developed
in  paragraph  59.- 41 -
58.  Finally,  it  may  be noted  that  no reference  has  been  made  to two  paths
to  tariff  reform  that  have  been  discussed  in  the  trade  literature. 33 One  is  the
'"concertina'  method  which  collapses  the  structure  by reducing  the  top  rate  at
each  step  of  the  transition  to  the  next  highest  level,  while  leaving  other  rates
the  same. A second  is  the  "radial"  method  whereby  at  each  stage  all  tariffs  are
reduced  to  a fraction  of their  previous  levels. However,  the  conditions  under
which  these paths to  reform improve matters are  stringent.  Thus, the
"concertina" method,  to  be  welfare-improving, essentially  requires
substitutability  among  commodities,  a feature  that is almost  certainly  false
when intermediates  and  capital  goods  are  imported  as well  as final  goods. The
"radial"  method,  on  the  other  hand,  is  welfare-improving  (i)  either  if  there  are
no domestic  taxes (ii)  or, more generally,  if those taxes  are also reduced
radially,  in either  of which cases the country's  revenue  base would suffer
significant  erosion.  Furthermore,  the  methods  require  the  government  to  be  able
to offset  the  revenue  gains  and  losses  at each  stage  through  lump  sum  taxes  and
subsidies,  a  feature  that  greatly  limits  their  relevance  for  policy. As against
that,  it is not known  whether  these  rules  perform  reasonably  well as rules  of
thumb  in a class  of situations  wider  than  those  where  they  can  be shown  to  be
desirable. In  practice,  it  would  be preferable  at  the  outset  to  preannounce  the
desired  tariff  structure  as  well  as  a  realistic  timetable  that  allows  producers
to adjust  towards  it.
Towards  ExDlicit  Assistance
59.  Reference  has also been made above to revenue  needs arising from
demands  for adjustment  assistance  by producers  adversely  affected  by tariff
reduction. Thus,  it is  sometimes  the  case  that  a tariff  on a  key intermediate
33For  an extended  discussion,  see  Corden  (1974).- 42 -
good  such  as steel  is  imposed  to  protect  one  or two  large  and  visible  high-cost
local  producers,  possibly  but  not  necessarily  in the  public  sector. Reduction
of  the  tariff  on  steel  is  recommended  in  order  to  make  downstream  producers,  say
producers  of  light  engineering  goods,  more  competitive  in  export  markets.  While
the latter  is an objective  with  which  the  government  is in agreement,  concern
is however expressed  that the reform  would make local producers  of steel
uneconomic,  threatening  jobs and leading  to other  negative  consequences. In
such a  situation,  the affected  producers are few and visible and almost
certainly  registered  with the  domestic  tax  authorities.  It  would  therefore  be
administratively  feasible  to  extend  assistance  to  those  producers  via  subsidies,
with the required  revenue  coming  from the sales  tax/VAT  adjustment  made in
combination  with  the  reduction  in  protective  customs  duties. Such  a  policy,  in
contrast  with  tariff  protection,  would  have  the  advantage  of  being  explicit  and
therefore  subject  to periodic  budgetary  scrutiny.  There is therefore  some
likelihood  that such assistance  would  be more timebound  and less "permanent"
than assistance  via tariffs.  Hence this is a policy  change that should  be
suggested  in such  cases.
3 4
VI.  CONCLUSIONS
60.  The  main points emerging  from the analysis  may be summarized  as
follows.
(1)  Since  it  is  generally accepted that  lack  of  supportive
macroeconomic  policies  has led to delays  or reversal  in trade  liberalization
programs,  it is important  that  potential  losses  in  public  revenue  arising  from
34A recent  review  of the  Bank's  approach  to subsidies,  Myers  and  Brondolo
(1986)  took  the  view  that  explicit  subsidies  are  preferable  to  implicit  subsidies
and  that  it  is  undesirable  to  finance  subsidies  through  nonbudgetary  instruments.- 43 -
tariff  reductions  to  be  offset  so  as  not  to  exacerbate  macroeconomic
difficulties.  The  common  practice  of  pursuing  tariff  and  tax  studies
independently carries the risk that the revenue implications of tariff reform
and  the  implications  for  protection  of  tax  reform  may  not  be  properly
integrated,  with negative consequences for the credibility of policy change.
(2)  The adoption of a more  comprehensive  public finance perspective
on policy reform is made possible by the fact that even the poorest countries
have  essentially two sets of instruments for the taxation of  imports:  (a)
customs duties and (b) sales taxes/value added taxes, that are usually levied
on  the  customs duty-inclusive value  of  imports and that apply  to domestic
transactions as  well.  Since the customs duty raises  the price facing producers
of an import above the world price, it is a subsidy to domestic producers.
Since the sales tax/value  added tax, together  with the customs duty, raises the
price facing users of the import above the world price, they constitute a tax
on domestic  users.  The customs  duty can then serve  protection objectives,  while
the two together can be designed to meet revenue requirements.
(3)  The following integrated structure of taxes cum tar'ffs provides
a point of reference towards  which reforms  may be directed.  This comprises (a)
a basic customs duty at a uniform rate of no more than 10 to 15 percent, (b) a
basic value added tax,  preferably of the  consumption type,  applying at  a uniform
rate depending on revenue requirements, to  domestic production and imports,  and
exempting agriculture, La particular nonmarketed food consumed by the poorest,
(c) a luxury rate of excises applying at a common rate to domestic production
and imports  of selected items, (d)  zero rating of exports under the value added
tax, (e) exemption of imported inputs entering export production from customs
duty, and  (f) taxe- on selected exports either where world  demand for the- 44 -
country's  exports is expected  to remain inelastic  or where the country  is
subject  to  export  quotas  or  where  there  are  significant  constraints  on land  or
income  taxes. The  paper  argues  that  it  is  important  to  view  the  above  elements
as part of an interrelated  package so that,  for example,  attempts  to unify
customs  duties  at levels  higher  than the  recommended  range [as  in (a))  would
create administrative  problems in implementing  duty exemptions  on  inputs
entering  export  production  [point  (e)].
(4)  The above  prescriptions  must be regarded  as rules  of thumb  that
can generate  broadly  acceptable  outcomes  in terms  of efficiency,  equity  and
protection and that should be flexibly applied in the  light of country
circumstances  and  administrative  capability.  They  are  not  properties  of  optimal
tariff  and  tax  structures.  Thus the  value  to  policy  advisors  of analytically-
oriented  studies  of taxes  and tariffs  would  be enhanced  if the latter  were to
identify  circumstances  where the pursuit of  such rules is likely to be
inappropriate,  rather  than  construct  empirically  implausible  special  cases  where
they  hold  exactly.
(5)  The coordinated  reform  of an existing  distorted  structure  of
tariffs  and  domestic  taxes  in  accordance  with  the  above  principles  will  include
the following  components. The sales  tax/VAT  rates  on domestic  production  and
imports  should  be matched,  so as to transfer  the function  of protection  to
customs duties.  Customs duties on items for which there is no domestic
production  and which are therefore  purely  revenue-raising  should  be brought
under  the  rubric  of the  sales  tax/VAT,  i.e.,  apply  at the  same  rate  to imports
and  possible  future  domestic  production.  A lowering  of  customs  duties  to  reduce
the  excess  of producer  prices  over  world  prices  (the  element  of  protection),  if
unaccompanied  by other  measures,  would  also reduce  the excess  of user prices- 45 -
over world  prices  (the customs duty-cum-sales tax on users) and thus erode
public  revenue.  Hence  reduction  of protection  Rer  se,  interpreted  as  a
narrowing of the  wedge between producer prices and world prices, is achieved by
combining the lowering of customs duties  with an equal  upward adjustment to the
sales tax/VAT structure to restore the tax  wedge between user prices and world
prices prevailing before the tariff  reduction.  Thus,  however, would  be revenue-
enhancing because  the sales tax/VAT applies to  imports as well as  domestic
consumption, so that the higher rate structure, while exactly offsetting the
revenue loss f.im customs duties on imports, would bring in more revenue from
domestic consumption.  If the objective is simply to offset the revenue losses
from tariff reductions,  a smaller adjustment  to the  sales tax/VAT structure  than
the one described above will suffice.  More realistically, the rate structure
would need to be raised somewhat beyond the point of revenue-neutrality so as
to allow the government to meet such demands for adjustment assistance as may
arise from sectors adversely affected by tariff reductions.  Such assistance,
if  extended via  the budgetary process, would  have  the advantage vis-a-vis
protective tariffs of being explicit and thus subject to periodic scrutiny.- 46 -
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